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The most commonly used principle of division of assets and debts is the principle of proportionality, which derived from 
Aristotle. The main area of application of that rule is the electoral law. An example of another solution can be found in the 
Lisbon Treaty, which sets out the rule of digressively proportional representation of EU Member States in the European 
Parliament. The problem is that there are many acceptable solutions. In this paper an attempt is made to determine the boundary 
conditions in such a way that the rules used for the proportional divisions would also lead to an unambiguous solution in the case 
of digressively proportional division. 
Keywords: Degressive proportionality, European Parliament, fair division, boundary conditions;  
1. Introduction 
The most common applications are the method of distribution of wealth is a proportional allocation. If it goes to 
divisible goods, the method is clear, in the case of indivisible goods all of its limitations and pitfalls resulting from 
the necessity to implement rounding are well known. The current and past electoral laws effectively address the 
problems that may be encountered in practice using the proportional division. Overview of issues related to the 
proportional division, for example, the relationship between the electoral legislations is included in the work by 
Young (1994). 
In most cases ratios of representations are determined in proportion to the population of constituencies included 
in the given body – a region, country, group of countries, etc. When there appear large disparities in constituencies’ 
population and inability to artificially correct these differences, the principle of proportional allocation encounters 
serious obstacles. This is the case for the European Union and its citizens represented by the European Parliament. 
Since 2007, the community consists of 27 countries. The least populated country is Malta, whose population in 2012 
was 416 thousand, the most populated country with 81,843 thousand citizens is Germany. Such large disparities in 
population prevent the application of proportional rules along with ensuring fair representation of each country. If 
one would like to ensure at least one representative for Malta, according to one of the classic rules of proportional 
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allocation, the Germans would have to get no less than 197 seats in the parliament consisting of at least 1,208 
members.  
2. Degressive proportionality 
Since the beginning of the European Parliament allocation of seats among the Member States of the European 
Union (and its predecessors) was not a proportional division. Table 1 shows the number of seats each member state 
was entitled to in 1979. The fourth column of the table shows that the larger the State (in terms of population), the 
bigger the ratio of population/number of seats corresponds to it. This ratio indicates how much of the population 




Table 1. Number of MEPs in 1979 
 
A B C D E F G 
Member States Population Seats pop/seats (In)  In/ In-1 In/ I1 I1/ In 
Germany 61 321 663 81 I1=757 058  1,0000 1,0000 
Italy 56 247 017 81 I2=694 408 I2/ I1=0,9172 I2/ I1=0,9172 I1/ I2=1,0902 
United Kingdom 56 209 039 81 I3=693 939 I3/ I2=0,9993 I3/ I1=0,9166 I1/ I3=1,0910 
France 53 481 073 81 I4=660 260 I4/ I3=0,9515 I4/ I1=0,8721 I1/ I4=1,1466 
Netherlands 13 985 526 25 I5=559 421 I5/ I4=0,8473 I5/ I1=0,7389 I1/ I5=1,3533 
Belgium 9 841 654 24 I6=410 069 I6/ I5=0,7330 I6/ I1=0,5417 I1/ I66=1,8462 
Denmark 5 111 537 16 I7=319 471 I7/ I6=0,7791 I7/ I1=0,4220 I1/ I7=2,3697 
Ireland 3 354 700 15 I8=223 647 I8/ I7=0,7001 I8/ I1=0,2954 I1/ I8=3,3851 
Luxembourg 362 261 6 I9=60 377 I9/ I8=0,2700 I9/ I1=0,0798 I1/ I9=12,5388 
TOTAL 259 914 470 410 633 938    
Source: own work based on the European Parliament data. 
 
Columns E, F and G of Table 1 are the measures of proportionality of the division. The division is the more 
proportional, the closer to unity values in these columns are. Values lower than one in column E signify the fact that 
the state has more seats than it would have when a proportional distribution was in place (in relation to the state 
preceding it in the table). The values of column G shows how many times more seats a country has in comparison to 
the number of seat it would have with the proportional distribution in regards to the largest of the states. Because of 
the states in Table 1 are arranged from largest to smallest so the last value in column G is in some senses a measure 
of the total derogation of the given allocation from the proportional distribution. For example, the value of column G 
for Luxembourg is 12.5388, which means that if the division were to be proportionate, the Germans would have to 
have 12.5 times more seats than there are in the allocation of Luxembourg. 
It is worth noting that the values in column D decrease with the population of the state. This is confirmed by the 
values of the coefficients in column E (all are less than 1), so during the distribution seats of to the European 
Parliament for the term from 1979 to 1984 the following principle was used: 
 
If one cannot allocate proportionally, let the small have more. 
 
The European Parliament has operated under its present name since 1962. Since the beginning of the Parliament, 
for the same reasons already mentioned, it could not be elected using proportional division. Seats distribution was 
done on the basis of political negotiations before every election, for the period of five years. The allocation of seats 
was not a result of any strict criterion it was based more on an intuitive sense of justice. 
Currently, the European Union has 27 members (in the near future, after ratification of the relevant treaty among 
the Member States, Croatia will be the next member of the structures). The basic document underlying the legal 
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framework for selecting the composition of the EP is the Treaty of Lisbon. In the article [9 A] of the Treaty devoted 
to European Union (with the changes introduced within the Treaty of Lisbon) we read: 
 
2. The European Parliament shall be composed of representatives of the Union's citizens. They shall not exceed 
seven hundred and fifty in number, plus the President. Representation of citizens shall be depressively proportional, 
with a minimum threshold of six members per Member State. No Member State shall be allocated more than ninety-
six seats. The European Council shall adopt by unanimity, on the initiative of the European Parliament and with its 
consent, a decision establishing the composition of the European Parliament, respecting the principles referred to in 
the first subparagraph. 
 
In its session of 11 October 2007, the Parliament adopted a resolution (prepared by the AFCO Committee in its 
report of October 3, 2007), annex of which states inter alia that: 
 
The principle of depressive proportionality provided for in Article [9a] of the Treaty on European Union shall be 
applied as follows: 
– the minimum and maximum numbers set by the Treaty must be fully utilized to ensure that the allocation of 
seats in the European Parliament reflects as closely as possible the range of populations of the Member States; 
– the larger the population of a country, the greater its entitlement to a large number of seats; 
– the larger the population of a country, the more inhabitants are represented by each of its Members of the 
European Parliament. 
 
What is currently meant by digressive proportionality rule is composed of five conditions: 
 
W1. no smaller State shall receive more seats than a larger State, 
W2. the ratio population / seats shall increase as population increases, 
 
B1. the minimum number of seats a state receives is set – m, 
B2. the maximum number of seats a state receives is set – M, 
B3. the total number of seats in Parliament is set – H. 
 
Although there is no provision requires that Parliament had exactly as many MPs as is the upper limit of the 
Treaty (Lisbon Treaty says only that this number cannot be exceeded), the majority of studies about this issue takes 
just such an interpretation. 
Terms of W1 and W2 are independent of the quantitative situation characterizing the composition of the European 
Union (the number of countries and their populations). They are more of general characteristics of digressive 
proportionality. Conditions B1, B2, B3 will be called boundary conditions. In the current state of the law it is 
6m = , 96M = , 751H = . 
Imposition of specific values for the boundary conditions in legal regulations may result in the need to change 
them in the context of future expansion or demographic changes. 
 
A significant change in the interpretation of the rules of depressive proportionality is presented in the European 
Parliament's resolution of 13 March 2013 (Gualtieri, Trzaskowski (2013)). It takes into account the proposal 
contained in the Cambridge Compromise (Grimmett et al (2011)). Article 1 of the resolution states that with the 
application of the principle of depressive proportionality: 
 
The ratio between the population and the number of seats of each Member State before rounding to whole numbers 
shall vary in relation to their respective populations in such a way that each Member of the European Parliament 
from a more populous Member State represents more citizens than each Member from a less populous Member 
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State and, conversely, that the larger the population of a Member State, the greater its entitlement to a large number 
of seats. 
 
Discussion of the findings presented in the Cambridge Compromise can be found, inter alia, in articles 
Dniestrzański (2011) and Grimmett (2011).  
3. New proposal - controlling boundary conditions 
Let, 1 2 ... np p p≤ ≤ ≤  be the populations of the succeeding countries, and 1m , 2m ,..., nm  the number of seats 
available to those countries. 
Determining minimum and maximum number of seats that the respectively smallest and largest state can (must) 
receive initiates generation of the suitable depression of division. The W2 condition results in the fact that for each









, where 1p  and np  are the smallest and the largest state’s 
populations respectively. 
Allocation of seats is made on the basis of the value of linear function of allocation (this function was considered in 
the work of Słomczyński and Życzkowski (2012)) [ ] [ ]: , ,A p P m M→  passing through the points with coordinates 
1( , )p m  and ( , )np M . It is easy to see that sequence 1( )A p , 2( )A p , ..., ( )nA p  is depressively proportional (with 
additional natural assumption that p P
m M
<  ) with respect to the sequence of population 1p , 2p , ..., np  (i.e. it 
satisfies the conditions W1 and W2). Number of seats can be assigned to a state with a population of ip , is the 
rounded value of ( )iA p  to an integer value. After rounding the conditions W1 and W2 may not be satisfied, 
however, taking into consideration the mentioned Article 1 of the European Parliament's resolution is enough for the 
condition W2 to be met before rounding. Typically, it is: 
 




[ ] [ ] [ ]1 2( ) ( ) ... ( ) 751nA p A p A p H+ + + = ≠  
 
where [ ]( )iA p   is the rounded number ( )iA p  to an integer (down, up, or the nearest). 
 
Let it be for the set m  and M  that: 
 
min 1 2( ) ( ) ... ( )nH A p A p A p= + + +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ , 
max 1 2( ) ( ) ... ( )nH A p A p A p= + + +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ , 
[ ] [ ] [ ]1 2( ) ( ) ... ( )a na a aH A p A p A p= + + + , 
 
where, x⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , ( x⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ) represent the rounding of the number x  down (up) to the nearest integer and [ ]ax  is the 
rounding of the number x  to the nearest integer. 
Values minH and maxH will be called the lower and upper limit for the function A . 
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Definition 
1 We say that the system of boundary conditions B1 - B3 is admissible if 
[ ]min max,H H H∈ . Otherwise, we say that the system is inadmissible. 
2 We say that the system of boundary conditions B1 - B3 is consistent if minH H=  or aH H=  or maxH H= . 
 
The above definition regards as admissible the boundary conditions that allow the use of allocation function A  
for the distribution of the seats. It verifies in a sense the validity of the imposed constraints (boundary conditions) in 
a given system of states and their populations. If minH H=  or maxH H= or aH H=  (consistent system) then when 
aiming at allocating seats in accordance with the described method, there is no choice - the allocation was made. If, 
however, it is [ ]min max,H H H∈ , but the system is not consistent, then there is a distribution of seats in which for 
each 1 i n≤ ≤ the number of seats for a state with population of ip varies from ( )iA p by less than 1. 
Table 2 lists the distribution of seats in the current legislature, distribution of seats adopted by the Parliament for 
the next term and the allocation of seats to resulting from implementation of the function A  with rounding down 
(column F) and up (column G). The statement includes Croatia, which is likely to become a member of the 
European Union in the current term. Total of 12 observers in Parliament at the disposal of Croatia was treated here 
as the number of members of Parliament. 
 
Table 2. Number of MEPs: current, 2014 – 2019; lower and upper limit for 6m =  and 96M =  
 
A B C D E F G 
member state population current 2014-2019 ( )iA p  ( )iA p⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  ( )iA p⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥  
Germany 81 843 743 99 96 96,00 96 96 
France 65 397 912 74 74 77,82 77 78 
United Kingdom 62 989 550 73 73 75,16 75 76 
Italy 60 820 764 73 73 72,76 72 73 
Spain 46 196 276 54 54 56,60 56 57 
Poland 38 538 447 51 51 48,14 48 49 
Romania 21 355 849 33 32 29,14 29 30 
Netherlands 16 730 348 26 26 24,03 24 25 
Greece 11 290 935 22 21 18,02 18 19 
Belgium 11 041 266 22 21 17,74 17 18 
Portugal 10 541 840 22 21 17,19 17 18 
Czech Republic 10 505 445 22 21 17,15 17 18 
Hungary 9 957 731 22 21 16,55 16 17 
Sweden 9 482 855 20 20 16,02 16 17 
Austria 8 443 018 19 18 14,87 14 15 
Bulgaria 7 327 224 18 17 13,64 13 14 
Denmark 5 580 516 13 13 11,71 11 12 
Slovakia 5 404 322 13 13 11,51 11 12 
Finland 5 401 267 13 13 11,51 11 12 
Ireland 4 582 769 12 11 10,61 10 11 
Croatia 4 398 150 12 11 10,40 10 11 
Lithuania 3 007 758 12 11 8,86 8 9 
Slovenia 2 055 496 8 8 7,81 7 8 
Latvia 2 041 763 9 8 7,80 7 8 
Estonia 1 339 662 6 6 7,02 7 8 
Cyprus 862 011 6 6 6,49 6 7 
Luxembourg 524 853 6 6 6,12 6 7 
Malta 416 110 6 6 6,00 6 6 
TOTAL 508 077 880 766 751 716,69 minH =705 maxH =731 
Source: own work. 
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Terms of the allocation of seats in Parliament of 8th term (2014 – 2019) ( 6m = , 96M = , 751H = ) form a 
inadmissible system - we have here min 705H = , max 731H =  (columns F and G of Table2). Table 3 shows all the 
valuesm  andM , which with value 751H =  create admissible systems. 
 
Table 3. Lower and upper limits creating an admissible system for 751H =  
 
m  and M  m  and M  m  and M  
0m =  121,125M ∈  9m =  90,92M ∈  18m =  57,60M ∈  
1m =  118,121M ∈  10m =  85,89M ∈  19m =  53,57M ∈  
2m =  114,117M∈  11m =  82,85M ∈  20m =  50,53M ∈  
3m =  110,114M∈  12m =  78,82M ∈  21m =  46,50M ∈  
4m =  107,110M∈  13m =  75,78M ∈  22m =  42,46M ∈  
5m =  103,107M∈  14m =  71,75M ∈  23m =  39,42M ∈  
6m =  100,103M ∈  15m =  67,71M ∈  24m =  35,39M ∈  
7m =  96,100M ∈  16m =  64,67M ∈  25m =  31,35M ∈  
8m =  92,96M ∈  17m =  60,64M ∈  26m =  27,31M ∈  
Source: own work. 
 
For the currently adopted size of the European Parliament ( 751H = ), there are 123 admissible systems. Among 
the admissible systems there are 16 consistent systems. All systems are consistent (for 751H = ) are provided in 
Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Consistent systems for 751H =  
 
1 0m =  121M =  max 751H =   9 17m =  62M =  751aH =  
2 2m =  116M =  751aH =   10 19m =  57M =  min 751H =  
3 5m =  103M =  min 751H =   11 19m =  55M =  751aH =  
4 8m =  92M =  max 751H =   12 20m =  53M =  min 751H =  
5 9m =  91M =  751aH =   13 20m =  51M =  751aH =  
6 10m =  85M =  max 751H =   14 21m =  50M =  min 751H =  
7 13m =  77M =  751aH =   15 22m =  46M =  min 751H =  
8 14m =  75M =  min 751H =   16 25m =  31M =  max 751H =  
Source: own work. 
 
The presented consistent systems with 751-member-Parliament form a wide range of possibilities of using the 
proposed method. The consistent division for 0m =  and 121M =  is close to the proportional division. The results 
of the simulation say that with this division six of the largest EU Member States would receive 527 seats (about 
70.17%). At the same time the population of these countries accounts for 70.03% of the population of all countries 
of the community. The other extreme consistent division ( 25m = , 31M = ) is very close to the equal division, as 
many as 19 countries would receive in this case 26 seats each. 
Among all consistent systems the system 8m =  and 92M = is closest to provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon  
( 6m ≥ and 96M ≤ ). Table 5 compares the distribution of seats of the 8th term with a division for 8m = and 
92M = among which there is a consistent system with the function A  values rounded up. 
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Table 5. Number of MEPs: 2014 – 2019; lower and upper limit for 8m =  and 92M =  
 
A B C D E F G 
member state  8m =  i 92M =   
 2014-2019 ( )iA p  ( )iA p⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥  ( )iA p⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  [ ]( )i aA p  
difference 
D-B 
Germany 96 92,00 92 92 92 -4 
France 74 75,03 76 75 75 2 
United Kingdom 73 72,55 73 72 73 0 
Italy 73 70,31 71 70 70 -2 
Spain 54 55,23 56 55 55 2 
Poland 51 47,33 48 47 47 -3 
Romania 32 29,60 30 29 30 -2 
Netherlands 26 24,83 25 24 25 -1 
Greece 21 19,22 20 19 19 -1 
Belgium 21 18,96 19 18 19 -2 
Portugal 21 18,45 19 18 18 -2 
Czech Republic 21 18,41 19 18 18 -2 
Hungary 21 17,84 18 17 18 -3 
Sweden 20 17,35 18 17 17 -2 
Austria 18 16,28 17 16 16 -1 
Bulgaria 17 15,13 16 15 15 -1 
Denmark 13 13,33 14 13 13 1 
Slovakia 13 13,15 14 13 13 1 
Finland 13 13,14 14 13 13 1 
Ireland 11 12,30 13 12 12 2 
Croatia 11 12,11 13 12 12 2 
Lithuania 11 10,67 11 10 11 0 
Slovenia 8 9,69 10 9 10 2 
Latvia 8 9,68 10 9 10 2 
Estonia 6 8,95 9 8 9 3 
Cyprus 6 8,46 9 8 8 3 
Luxembourg 6 8,11 9 8 8 3 
Malta 6 8,00 8 8 8 2 
TOTAL 751 736,11 max 751H =  min 725H =  734aH =   
Source: own work. 
 
4. Summary 
Terms of W1 and W2 determining the digressive proportionality are very general. They allow many possible 
solutions. Even taking into consideration the Treaty’s additional boundary conditions on the minimum, maximum 
and total number of deputies one can show that, regarding the population data of 2006, the number of such divisions 
exceeds 189 million (Łyko et al (2012)). An important feature of the construction of specific divisions is therefore 
boundary conditions B1 - B3. They clarify the right depression. It may also happen, that they are somewhat 
contradictory. If one accepts the supposition that the sought digressively proportional division should not, with 
accuracy to the nearest rounding, be very different from the natural allocation obtained with the defined function A  
it may occur that there is no such division. Referred to in article, the admissibility of boundary conditions is a formal 
record helping to avoid the said conflict. 
Calculations performed on the rules formulated for the distribution of seats among the Member States of the 
European Parliament attest to their internal contradictions. Equalities, 6m = , 96M = and 751H =  do not constitute 
an acceptable or even consistent system of boundary conditions. Therefore, all possible pairs of values were given 
for m  and M , which for the fixed 751H =  which constitute, for population data 1p , 2p , …, np  from the 2012 
such an admissible system. They provide 123 admissible systems and 16 consistent systems. Among the found ones, 
the couple 8m = , 92M =  differs the least from the restrictions indicated by the Lisbon Treaty ( 6m ≥ , 96M ≤ ). 
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An allocation was found of 751 seats, which for the couple 8m = , 92M = , is obtained by rounding the value 
( )iA p  up to the nearest integer. It may be noted that the proposed solution is relatively close to the division of seats 
for the term 2014-2019 adopted by the European Parliament (which is still waiting for approval by the European 
Council). Apart from Germany (where the difference of four seats is a direct consequence of the restriction 92M =
) the difference in the number of seats attributed to individual members of the Union shall be not more than 3. 
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